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Shelves: philosophy-and-logic This book gives a good introduction to contemporary neo-Aristotelean metaphysics as it is practiced in analytic departments. It discusses the classic but still unresolved problem of universals, providing a detailed overview of realism and nominalism, two camps that continue to return in later sections.
As is the case when talking about substrata, where substance and bundle theorists diverge along the same lines. Characteristic of analytic philosophy is its linguistic turn which here follows a This book gives a good introduction to contemporary neo-Aristotelean metaphysics as it is practiced in analytic departments. Characteristic of analytic philosophy is its linguistic turn which here follows a strong correspondence theory of truth that comes out when discussing propositions, facts, events, and states-of-affairs and their ontological status.
This part irked me because I think one cannot be more off the mark than this when it comes to language. Modality, causation and time receive extended treatment as well, discussing the usual suspects: possible worlds, Hume, A- and B-theories of time etc. There is a chapter on persistence through time of particulars and the book finishes with some anti-realist challenges. What I found most interesting though was the introduction. Here a justification is given as to why exactly we should go back to Aristotle in thinking about metaphysics as the study of being qua being.
The assumption is made that we have only our prephilosophical conception of the world, our intuitions, to rely on to decide what is good metaphysics and what is not. I have no great quarrel with this, because it is exactly true that there is nothing else on which to trust in these things, but it does not sound like a great method.
The job of metaphysics then consists in identifying the ontological categories under which all things fall such as particulars, propositions, thoughts, events, time, etc. These are followers of the Kantian project of critique and argue for a restriction of reason to empirical claims only.
They do this by pointing out that experience is constituted by our conceptual scheme or framework, that what our experience provides is a specifically human point of view of reality that is ordered by the application of general concepts regulated by certain principles that are applied to unstructured sense-experience e.
There would have to be a conceptual scheme that allows us to think this mediation, and then another one to think this second mediation, ad infinitum. I very much doubt this argument works. Does this include logic? Then yes, it is unsound, in arguing for conceptual schemes one would be using a prior conceptual scheme. I would go even farther and venture to say the neo-Aristotelian counter argument itself is faulty. It assumes the validity of the very inclusive conceptual scheme in order to show it leads to an infinite regress, but at the same time it relies on the neo-Aristotelian intuition about the absurdity of such a regress, an intuition the schemers hold we cannot trust.
An infinite regress does not involve a straight contradiction, so can we really say the very inclusive conceptual scheme is a logically inconsistent idea? I wrote a little review of process metaphysics here. Loux has a gift for taking complex ideas and rendering them approachable to the philosophical novice and I found that by the end of the book I was wishing for more.
He covers a variety of metaphysics topics including nominalism vs realism, substratum and bundle theory, Platonic and Aristotelian approaches to what counts as a thing and its relations to properties. Not shying away from the more technical he discusses the I loved this introduction to metaphysics and ended up taking detailed notes.
Not shying away from the more technical he discusses the ontology of propositions, facts, states of affairs and events. He has a very informative chapter on modality, including the actualism of Plantinga vs the possibilism of Lewis and varying conceptions of objects persisting through time giving a very clear picture of the two main rivals for the theory of what time is.
Each chapter argues for two or more sides in a debate over the subject matter covered including the views of relevant prominent philosophers.
Metaphysics: A Contemporary Introduction
Arara This fully revised and updated version of Loux is just extraordinarily clear, and fairly presents both sides of issues, raising objections that are reasonable and well-researched. John rated it really liked it Mar 20, Page 1 of 1 Start over Page 1 of 1. Nominalists as a general rule do not with exceptions. When one learns most all of what there is to know about math, physics, chemistry, astronomy, etc.
LOUX METAPHYSICS PDF
Sign in Create an account. Amazon Inspire Digital Educational Resources. Loux provides a fresh look at the central topics in metaphysics rendering this essential reading for anyone interested in metaphysics. Wherever possible, Loux links contemporary views to their classical sources in the history of philosophy. Ratings and Reviews 0 0 star ratings 0 reviews. Lowe — — Oxford University Press. This Contemporary Introduction is for at students of lpux who have already done an introductory philosophy course.